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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of the Application of
SHARTF A. RAHIEM, 89-A-2 141,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judzment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-1 1-ST2347 Index No. 115-11
Appearances :

Sharif A. Rahiem
Inmate No. 89-A-2 141
Petitioner, Pro Se
Fishkill Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 307
Beacon, NY 12508
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Adam W. Silverman,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Fishkill Correctional Facility, has commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated August 4,2010
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to deny prtitioner discretionary release on parole. Petitioner is serving a term of fifteen (15)

years to life upon a conviction of murder in the second degree. Among the many arguments
set forth in the petition, petitioner contends that the Parole Board focused solely on
petitioner’s instant offense and did not consider all the statutory factors; the Board failed to
consider the sentencing minutes; the Board did not consider petitioner’s positive programing
and achievements while incarcerated; the Board implemented an executive policy to deny
parole to violent felony offenders;

the Board’s decision was pre-determined; the

determination was unsupported by the record; the Board failed to timely respond to the
petitioners’s administrative appeal filed August 30,20 10; the Board’s determination violated
petitioner’s due process rights; and that the denial of parole was tantamount to a resentencing.
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on
parole are set forth as follows:
“Parole is denied. After a carehl review of your record, your
personal interview, and due deliberation, it is the determination
of this panel that, if released at this time, there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live at liberty without violating
thc l n v , your relmzr at thiy time is incomptible m-ith the
welfare and safety of the community, and will so deprecate the
seriousness of this crime as to undermine respect for law. This
decision is based upon the following factors: You appear before
this panel with the serious instant offense of murder 2”dwherein
you in concert shot and killed the victim. The extreme violence
associated with this terrible crime makes it clear that you had a
callous disregard for human life. Since your last appearance you
received a Tier I1 infraction for prison misconduct.
Consideration has been given to any program completion
however, your release at this time is denied.”
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As stated in Executive Law 8259-i (2) (c) (A):

“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii)
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release
program; (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative [I” (Executive Law 92594 [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,
200 11). If the Pxole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements,

the Board‘s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis,
supra). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon

v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of

-Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to dibdurb thc. disci L‘tiuimy dlc~ci1niniilioii
wade by

3

the Parole Uoard (see Matter of Perez v.

[* 4]

Ncn- YoA State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).

The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner's institutional employment and programming, his lack of prior criminal
convictions, his disciplinary record while incarcerated, his plans upon release, and a letter
from petitioner's defense attorney. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the
petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive
Law $259-i (mMatter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi,
201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941;Matter of Green v. New York State Division ofparole, 199
AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931).
It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the
inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of
Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of SinoDoli v New York State Board

of Parole. 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept.,
1996), as well aq the inmatr's criminal histor.) (u
Matlu of Fitrid v Travis, 239 Ab2d 629
[3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one

(see

Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 1681 [3rdDept., 20101; Matter
of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor must the
parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive
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Law 6 259-i (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3‘d Dept., 20061).
In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place
particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated,
as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in
determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’
whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether
release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’
(Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041,
quoting Executive Law 52594 [2] [c] [A], other citations omitted).
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses’s prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
DeDartment Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 20061; Matter ofKalwasinski v Paterson,
80 AI336 1065 [36 nept Tnniinry 10,201 13; Mattcr of C x t c v E\ ans, 51 AD3d 1031 [3d
~

Dept., February 3,201 11). The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence
does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of
Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3rdDept., 20081). The Parole Board is vested with
the discretion to determine whether release is appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the
sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner’s sentence
TI. I \ i-, 9; NY2J 470,

.~?CI

[ZOOO]; I b l d c ~
u i~L
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(see Matter of Silmon v

v Umiisoii, 3 3 AU2d 1141, 1142 15 ’
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Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd
Dept., 20071).
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent
felony offenders. The 2007 remarks of former Parole Commissioner Manleyl are not
indicative of the procedure undertaken by petitioner's 20 10 Parole Board, comprised of
Commissioners Greenan and Gallivan, and are therefore irrelevant to this case. The Court,
accordingly, finds no merit to the argument

(see Matter of Lue-Shing v Pataki, 30 1 AD2d

827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New York Division of Parole, 294
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 AD2d 800, 801 [3rd Dept.,
20021; Mntter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, Matter of Wood v
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rdDept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison, 38 AD3d 1030,
1031 [3rdDep., 20071; Matter of Garofolo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3rdDept., 20081;
Matter of MacKenzie v Dennison, 55 AD3d 1092, 866 NYS2d 384 [3rdDept., October 22,
20081).
With respect to petitioner's argument that the Appcals Unit fiii1Gd to i s a e a timely
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial
'In sum and substance, former Commissioner Manley, in an address before the New York
City Bar Association given on February 15, 2007, allegedly indicated that Parole Commissioners
were insufficiently trained for their employment duties; had insufficient time to consider and
review the inmate case file before them; and, because they were rushed and unprepared, would
commonly be reviewing papers for the next parole interview during the appearance of the inmate
then before them.
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review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR

6 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York

State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rdDept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex
rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rdDept., 20001; Matter of Mentor v New York State
Division of Parole, 67AD3d 1 108, 1 109 [3rdDept., 20091).
With regard to petitioner’s arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v
New Ynrk State Fd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that
Executive Law

6 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate

expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated
by the Parole Board’s exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19791; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,13671368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76,
supra, Mattcr of Gamw v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rJ Dcpt., 20051; Mattur-of L w d a v
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court,
accordingly, finds no due process violation.
With regard to the Parole Board’s failure to consider the minutes of petitioner’s
sentencing, it is now well settled that this does not mandate a new hearing if, as here, the
minutes were not available for review (see Matter of Freeman v Alexander, 65 AD3d 1429,
[3rdDept., ~ U U Y ] ; bhtter of Blasich v New York State Division of Parole, 68 ADjd 1339,
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1340-1341 [3rdDept., 20091; see also Matter of Lebron v Alexander, 68 AD3d 1476, 1477

[3rdDept., 20091 [Held: where the Parole Board is unable to consider the sentencing minutes
a favorable presumption does not arise]; Matter of Andreo v Alexander, 72 AD3d 1178 [3rd
Dept., 20 lo]). Respondents have submitted the affidavit of Randy Berkowitz, the court
reporter for the sentencing proceedings. This affidavit supports the Board’s assertion that
Mr. Berkowitz’s notes and transcript could not be located. As such, the Court finds that the
respondent made an adequate search for the sentencing minutes, and is unable to consider
them for reasons beyond the Parole Board’s control. For this reason petitioner’s argument
has no merit (see Matter of Andreo v Alexander, supra).
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions a d finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, arbitrary and capricious, or constitute an abuse
of discretion. The petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
ptitioncr were submittcd to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by scparate order,
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.
8
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decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

Dated:

g .(2:
4

ENTER
June 2 7 , 2 0 1 1
Troy, New York

-_

Supreme Court Justice
George B. Ceresia, Jr.

Papers Considered:
1.
2.

Order To Show Cause dated February 3,20 1 1, Petition, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated April 15,201 1, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of the Application of
SHARJF A. RAHIEM, 89-A-2 141,
Petitioner,
-againstNEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
WI # 01-1 1-ST2347 Index No. 115-11

SEALING ORDER
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in
camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent’s Exhibit B, Pre-

Sentence Investigation Report, and respondent’s Exhibit D, Confidential Portion of
Inmate Status Report. For good cause shown, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person
or public or private agency unless by further order of the Court.
ENTER
Dated:

June 3 7 ,201 1
Troy, New York

Yc George D. Ceresia, Jr.
Supreme Court Justice

